Dynamic Price Sequence and Incentive Compatibility
Ning Chen 
Friday, April 23, 2004.
11-12, room TBA



Abstract
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We introduce and study a new auction model in which a certain type
of good is offered over a period of time, and buyers arrive at
different times and stay until a common deadline (unless their
purchase requests have been fulfilled). We examine in this model
incentive compatible auction protocols ($i.e.$, those that induce
participants bid their true values).

We establish an interesting connection between incentive
compatibility and price sequence: incentive compatibility forces
an increasing price sequence under some assumptions on market
price schemes. We should point out that negation of our
assumptions would require market distortions to some extent.

Our protocol may not ensure that one item must be sold everyday.
Imposing such a market intervention, we show an impossibility
result that deterministic incentive compatible auction protocols
do not exist. We also discuss incentive compatible protocols under
other market conditions.

This is joint work with Xiaotie Deng, Xiaoming Sun and  Andrew C. Yao