Survey of Cache Side Channel Analysis

PhD Qualifying Examination


Title: "Survey of Cache Side Channel Analysis"

by

Mr. Yuanyuan YUAN


Abstract:

Cache side channels enable confidential data leakage through shared data and
instruction caches. Unprivileged adversaries can recover program secrets by
monitoring how victim software accesses cache units. Exploiting cache side
channels has been shown particularly effective for cryptographic systems such
as AES, RSA, and ElGamal. Recent attacks show that private user data including
images and text can be reconstructed. Cache side channel analysis aims to
assess the cache side channel leakage in a program (e.g., localizing leakage
sites, or quantifying leaked information), with proper models of information
leakage and program analysis techniques.

This survey presents a comprehensive review of existing cache side channel
analysis techniques. Specifically, we first study how this line of research has
been developing over the past decade. Then, we categorize existing works from
different dimensions, including the type of secrets, the objectives of
analysis, the adopted techniques, etc., and compare them using different
criteria. Finally, we discuss limitations and extensions of existing techniques
under different scenarios, providing insights for future research.


Date:                   Tuesday, 27 February 2024

Time:                   10:00am - 12:00noon

Venue:                  Room 5501
                        Lifts 25/26

Committee Members:      Dr. Shuai Wang (Supervisor)
                        Dr. Binhang Yuan (Chairperson)
                        Dr. Dongdong She
                        Dr. Wei Wang