Last Modified: 2006-11-02.

Course List:

  Course Name Time Place Instructor Homepage Notes
1 Algorithmic Game Theory 2004 Spring Cornell University Eva Tardos original / local all
2 Computational Game Theory 2003-2004 Tel Aviv University Yishay Mansour original / local all
3 Algorithmic Aspects of Game Theory 2001 Spring University of California at Berkeley Christos H. Papadimitriou original / local all
4 Game Theory and the Internet 2003 Fall University of California at Berkeley Christos H. Papadimitriou original / local all
5 Algorithms for Selfish Agents   University of Salerno Vincenzo Auletta
Paolo Penna
Giuseppe Persiano		 original / local all

Bibliography:

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    Aaron Archer, Christos Papadimitriou, Kunal Talwar, Eva Tardos.
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    SODA 2003: 14th Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, Pages 205-214.
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    Journal version:
    Aaron Archer, Christos Papadimitriou, Kunal Talwar, Eva Tardos.
    An Approximate Truthful Mechanism for Combinatorial Auctions with Single Parameter Agents.
    Internet Mathematics, 1(2): 129-150, 2003.
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    Aaron Archer, Eva Tardos.
    Frugal Path Mechanisms.
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    Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm.
    Complexity Results about Nash Equilibria.
    IJCAI 2003: 18th International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence, Pages 765-771.
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    STOC 2002: 34th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, Pages 287-296.
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    Artur Czumaj, Berthold Vocking.
    Tight Bounds for Worst-Case Equilibria.
    SODA 2002: 13th Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, Pages 413-420.
    [ps]
     
  18. []
    Constantinos Daskalakis, Paul W. Goldberg, Christos H. Papadimitriou.
    The Complexity of Computing a Nash Equilibrium.
    STOC 2006: 38th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, (to appear).
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    Combinatorial Auctions: A Survey.
    INFORMS Journal on Computing, 15(3): 284-309, 2003.
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    On the Complexity of Equilibria.
    STOC 2002: 34th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, Pages 67-71.
    [pdf] [ps]
     
  21. [1]
    Nikhil R. Devanur, Christos H. Papadimitriou, Amin Saberi, Vijay V. Vazirani.
    Market Equilibrium via a Primal-Dual-Type Algorithm.
    FOCS 2002: 43rd Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, Pages 389-395.
    [pdf] [ps]
     
  22. []
    Shahar Dobzinski, Noam Nisan, Michael Schapira.
    Truthful Randomized Mechanisms for Combinatorial Auctions.
    STOC 2006: 38th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, (to appear).
    [pdf]
     
  23. [3]
    Conference version:
    Cynthia Dwork, Ravi Kumar, Moni Naor, D. Sivakumar.
    Rank Aggregation Methods for the Web.
    WWW 2001: 10th International Conference on World Wide Web, Pages 613-622.
    [pdf]
    Journal version:
    Cynthia Dwork, Ravi Kumar, Moni Naor, D. Sivakumar.
    Rank Aggregation Revisited.
    Unknown.
    [pdf] [ps]
     
  24. []
    Edith Elkind, Amit Sahai, Ken Steiglitz.
    Frugality in Path Auctions.
    SODA 2004: 15th Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, Pages 701-709.
    [pdf] [ps]
     
  25. [2]
    Eyal Even-Dar, Alex Kesselman, Yishay Mansour.
    Convergence Time to Nash Equilibria.
    ICALP 2003: 30th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages and Programming, LNCS 2719, Pages 502-513.
    [pdf] [pdf]
     
  26. [2]
    Eyal Even-Dar, Yishay Mansour.
    Fast Convergence of Selfish Rerouting.
    SODA 2005: 16th Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, Pages 772-781.
    [pdf]
     
  27. [1] [2]
    Alex Fabrikant, Christos Papadimitriou, Kunal Talwar.
    The Complexity of Pure Nash Equilibria [Extended Abstract].
    STOC 2004: 36th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, Pages 604-612.
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  28. [3]
    Michalis Faloutsos, Petros Faloutsos, Chrostos Faloutsos.
    On Power-Law Relationships of the Internet Topology.
    SIGCOMM 1999: Conference on Applications, Technologies, Architectures, and Protocols for Computer Communication, Pages 251-262.
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  29. [1]
    Joan Feigenbaum, Christos Papadimitriou, Rahul Sami, Scott Shenker.
    A BGP-Based Mechanism for Lowest-Cost Routing.
    PODC 2002: 21st Annual Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing, Pages 173-182.
    [ps]
     
  30. [3] [5]
    Conference version:
    Joan Feigenbaum, Christos Papadimitriou, Scott Shenker.
    Sharing the Cost of Multicast Transmissions (Preliminary Version).
    STOC 2000: 32nd Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, Pages 218-227.
    [ps]
    Journal version:
    Joan Feigenbaum, Christos H. Papadimitriou, Scott Shenker.
    Sharing the Cost of Multicast Transmissions.
    Journal of Computer and System Sciences, 63(1): 21-41, 2001.
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  31. []
    Amos Fiat, Andrew V. Goldberg, Jason D. Hartline, Anna R. Karlin.
    Competitive Generalized Auctions.
    STOC 2002: 34th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, Pages 72-81.
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    Yoav Freund, Robert E. Schapire.
    Adaptive Game Playing Using Multiplicative Weights.
    Games and Economic Behavior, 29(1-2): 79-103, 1999.
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  33. [3]
    Eric J. Friedman, Scott Shenker.
    Learning and Implementation on the Internet.
    Submitted, 1997.
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  34. [3]
    Eric Friedman, Mikhael Shor, Scott Shenker, Barry Sopher.
    An Experiment on Learning with Limited Information: Nonconvergence, Experimentation Cascades, and the Advantage of Being Slow.
    Games and Economic Behavior, 47(2): 325-352, 2004.
    [pdf] [pdf] [ps]
     
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    John Geanakoplos.
    Three Brief Proofs of Arrow's Impossibility Theorem.
    Discussion Paper, Number 1123, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, 1996.
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    Resource Pricing and the Evolution of Congestion Control.
    Automatica, 35(12): 1969-1985, 1999.
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  37. []
    Andrew V. Goldberg, Jason D. Hartline.
    Competitiveness via Consensus.
    SODA 2003: 14th Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, Pages 215-222.
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    Andrew V. Goldberg, Jason D. Hartline, Anna R. Karlin, Michael Saks.
    A Lower Bound on the Competitive Ratio of Truthful Auctions.
    STACS 2004: 21st Annual Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science, LNCS 2996, Pages 644-655.
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    Technical report:
    Andrew Goldberg, Jason Hartline, Andrew Wright.
    Competitive Auctions and Digital Goods.
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    [pdf]
    Conference version:
    Andrew V. Goldberg, Jason D. Hartline, Andrew Wright.
    Competitive Auctions and Digital Goods.
    SODA 2001: 12th Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, Pages 735-744.
    [pdf] [ps]
    Journal version:
    Andrew V. Goldberg, Jason D. Hartline, Anna R. Karlin, Andrew Wright, Michael Saks.
    Competitive Auctions.
    Submitted.
    [pdf] [ps]
     
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    John Hershberger, Subhash Suri.
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    Published version:
    John Hershberger, Subhash Suri.
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    FOCS 2001: 42nd Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, Pages 252-259.
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    Erratum:
    John Hershberger, Subhash Suri.
    Erratum to "Vickrey Pricing and Shortest Paths: What Is an Edge Worth?"
    FOCS 2002: 43rd Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, Pages 809-809.
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  43. []
    John Hershberger, Subhash Suri, Amit Bhosle.
    On the Difficulty of Some Shortest Path Problems.
    STACS 2003: 20th Annual Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science, LNCS 2607, Pages 343-354.
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  44. [2]
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    Mechanism Theory.
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    Unknown.
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  46. [1] [5]
    Kamal Jain, Vijay V. Vazirani.
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  50. []
    Conference version:
    Adam Kalai, Santosh Vempala.
    Efficient Algorithms for Online Decision Problems.
    COLT 2003: 16th Annual Conference on Learning Theory, LNCS 2777, Pages 26-40.
    [pdf] [ps]
    Journal version:
    Adam Kalai, Santosh Vempala.
    Efficient Algorithms for Online Decision Problems.
    Journal of Computer and System Sciences, 71(3): 291-307, 2005.
    [pdf]
     
  51. []
    David R. Karger, Evdokia Nikolova.
    VCG Overpayment in Random Graphs.
    DIMACS Workshop on Computational Issues in Auction Design, 2004.
    [pdf] [ps]
     
  52. [3]
    Richard Karp, Elias Koutsoupias, Christos Papadimitriou, Scott Shenker.
    Optimization Problems in Congestion Control.
    FOCS 2000: 41st Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, Pages 66-74.
    [pdf] [ps]
     
  53. [1] [3]
    Michael Kearns, Michael L. Littman, Satinder Singh.
    Graphical Models for Game Theory.
    UAI 2001: 17th Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence, Pages 253-260.
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    Charging and Rate Control for Elastic Traffic.
    European Transactions on Telecommunications, 8: 33-37, 1997.
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    IEE Proceedings Software, 146(1): 39-43, 1999.
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    Elias Koutsoupias, Christos Papadimitriou.
    Worst-Case Equilibria.
    STACS 1999: 16th Annual Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science, LNCS 1563, Pages 404-413.
    [pdf] [ps]
     
  58. [3]
    Conference version:
    Ravi Kumar, Prabhakar Raghavan, Sridhar Rajagopalan, D. Sivakumar, Andrew Tomkins, Eli Upfal.
    Stochastic Models for the Web Graph.
    FOCS 2000: 41st Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, Pages 57-65.
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    Journal version:
    Ravi Kumar, Prabhakar Raghavan, Sridhar Rajagopalan, D. Sivakumar, Andrew Tomkins, Eli Upfal.
    Stochastic Models for the Web Graph.
    Unknown.
    [ps]
     
  59. [3]
    Conference version:
    Ron Lavi, Noam Nisan.
    Competitive Analysis of Incentive Compatible On-Line Auctions.
    EC 2000: 2nd ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, Pages 233-241.
    [pdf]
    Journal version:
    Ron Lavi, Noam Nisan.
    Competitive Analysis of Incentive Compatible On-Line Auctions.
    Theoretical Computer Science, 310(1-3): 159-180, 2004.
    [pdf] [ps]
     
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    Daniel Lehmann, Liadan Ita Ocallaghan, Yoav Shoham.
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    Journal of the ACM, 49(5): 577-602, 2002.
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    Playing Large Games Using Simple Strategies.
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    Journal of the ACM, 49(2): 207-235, 2002.
    [pdf] [pdf]
     
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    Pricing Congestible Network Resources.
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  66. [1] [2]
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    Serial Cost Sharing.
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    Average Cost Pricing versus Serial Cost Sharing: An Axiomatic Comparison.
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    Strategyproof Sharing of Submodular Costs: Budget Balance versus Efficiency.
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    Truthful Approximation Mechanisms for Restricted Combinatorial Auctions.
    AAAI/IAAI 2002: 18th National Conference on Artificial Intelligence and 14th Conference on Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence, Pages 379-384.
    [ps]
     
  71. []
    Roger B. Myerson.
    Optimal Auction Design.
    Mathematics of Operations Research, 6(1): 58-73, 1981.
    [pdf]
     
  72. []
    Conference version:
    Enrico Nardelli, Guido Proietti, Peter Widmayer.
    Finding the Most Vital Node of a Shortest Path.
    COCOON 2001: 7th Annual International Conference on Computing and Combinatorics, LNCS 2108, Pages 278-287.
    [pdf]
    Journal version:
    Enrico Nardelli, Guido Proietti, Peter Widmayer.
    Finding the Most Vital Node of a Shortest Path.
    Theoretical Computer Science, 296(1): 167-177, 2003.
    [pdf]
     
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    Non-Cooperative Games.
    The Annals of Mathematics, 2nd Series, 54(2): 286-295, 1951.
    [pdf]
     
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    Noam Nisan.
    Algorithms for Selfish Agents: Mechanism Design for Distributed Computation.
    STACS 1999: 16th Annual Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science, LNCS 1563, Pages 1-15.
    [pdf] [ps]
     
  75. [3]
    Noam Nisan.
    Bidding and Allocation in Combinatorial Auctions.
    EC 2000: 2nd ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, Pages 1-12.
    [pdf] [pdf] [ps]
     
  76. [1] [3] [5]
    Conference version:
    Noam Nisan, Amir Ronen.
    Algorithmic Mechanism Design (Extended Abstract).
    STOC 1999: 31st Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, Pages 129-140.
    Journal version:
    Noam Nisan, Amir Ronen.
    Algorithmic Mechanism Design.
    Games and Economic Behavior, 35(1-2): 166-196, 2001.
    [pdf] [pdf] [ps]
     
  77. [3]
    Andrew Odlyzko.
    A Modest Proposal for Preventing Internet Congestion.
    DIMACS Technical Report, 97-68, 1997.
    [ps] [ps]
     
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    Extended abstract:
    Christos H. Papadimitriou.
    Algorithms, Games, and the Internet (Extended Abstract).
    ICALP 2001: 28th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages and Programming, LNCS 2076, Pages 1-3.
    [pdf]
    Full version:
    Christos H. Papadimitriou.
    Algorithms, Games, and the Internet.
    STOC 2001: 33rd Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, Pages 749-753.
    [pdf] [ps]
     
  79. [1]
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    Computing Equilibria in Multi-Player Games.
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    [ps]
     
  80. [2] [3]
    Conference version:
    Christos H. Papadimitriou, Mihalis Yannakakis.
    On Complexity as Bounded Rationality (Extended Abstract).
    STOC 1994: 26th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, Pages 726-733.
    [pdf]
    Journal version:
    Christos H. Papadimitriou, Mihalis Yannakakis.
    On Bounded Rationality and Computational Complexity.
    Submitted, 2002.
    [ps]
     
  81. [3]
    Christos H. Papadimitriou, Mihalis Yannakakis.
    On the Approximability of Trade-Offs and Optimal Access of Web Sources (Extended Abstract).
    FOCS 2000: 41st Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, Pages 86-92.
    [ps]
     
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    David C. Parkes.
    Optimal Auction Design for Agents with Hard Valuation Problems.
    IJCAI 1999: Workshop on Agent Mediated Electronic Commerce II, LNCS 1788, Pages 206-219.
    [pdf]
     
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    David C. Parkes, Lyle H. Ungar.
    Iterative Combinatorial Auctions: Theory and Practice.
    AAAI 2000: 17th National Conference on Artificial Intelligence, Pages 74-81.
    [pdf] [ps]
     
  84. []
    John G. Riley, William F. Samuelson.
    Optimal Auctions.
    The American Economic Review, 71(3): 381-392, 1981.
    [pdf]
     
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    Amir Ronen.
    Algorithms for Rational Agents.
    SOFSEM 2000: 27th Conference on Current Trends in Theory and Practice of Informatics, LNCS 1963, Pages 56-70.
    [pdf] [pdf]
     
  86. [3] [5]
    Conference version:
    Tim Roughgarden.
    Stackelberg Scheduling Strategies.
    STOC 2001: 33rd Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, Pages 104-113.
    [pdf]
    Journal version:
    Tim Roughgarden.
    Stackelberg Scheduling Strategies.
    SIAM Journal on Computing, 33(2): 332-350, 2004.
    [pdf] [pdf] [ps] [ps]
     
  87. [1]
    Conference version:
    Tim Roughgarden.
    Designing Networks for Selfish Users Is Hard.
    FOCS 2001: 42nd Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, Pages 472-481.
    [pdf]
    Journal version:
    Tim Roughgarden.
    On the Severity of Braess's Paradox: Designing Networks for Selfish Users Is Hard.
    To appear.
    [ps]
     
  88. [1]
    Conference version:
    Tim Roughgarden.
    The Price of Anarchy Is Independent of the Network Topology.
    STOC 2002: 34th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, Pages 428-437.
    [pdf]
    Journal version:
    Tim Roughgarden.
    The Price of Anarchy Is Independent of the Network Topology.
    Journal of Computer and System Sciences, 67(2): 341-364, 2003.
    [pdf] [ps]
     
  89. []
    Tim Roughgarden, Mukund Sundararajan.
    New Trade-Offs in Cost-Sharing Mechanisms.
    STOC 2006: 38th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, (to appear).
    [pdf]
     
  90. [1] [2] [3] [5]
    Conference version:
    Tim Roughgarden, Eva Tardos.
    How Bad Is Selfish Routing?
    FOCS 2000: 41st Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, Pages 93-102.
    [ps]
    Journal version:
    Tim Roughgarden, Eva Tardos.
    How Bad Is Selfish Routing?
    Journal of the ACM, 49(2): 236-259, 2002.
    [pdf] [ps]
     
  91. [1]
    Scott Shenker.
    Making Greed Work in Networks: A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Switch Service Disciplines.
    SIGCOMM 1994: Conference on Communications Architectures, Protocols and Applications, Pages 47-57.
    [pdf]
     
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